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ABSTRACT
Actor-network theory is considered to have great potential for broadening and
deepening our grasp of institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). Given its
focus on process, ANT offers a means to breathe life into the practices associated
with institutionalization. With Callon’s (1986) four moments of translation as
analytical lens, and with Ireland’s Industrial Development Authority as empirical
example, I seek to address the concerns in the call for papers to reconsider ‘the role
of agency, power, persistence and change in the process of institutionalization.’
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INTRODUCTION
Actor-network theory (ANT) is considered to have great potential for broadening and
deepening our grasp of institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). Given its
focus on process, ANT offers a means to breathe life into the practices associated
not just with institutionalization, but also de-institutionalization, rather than
concentrate on institutions as reified structures (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996).
In addressing institutionalization, actor-network theory focuses on relational
materiality, employing a material semiotics whereby actors, human and nonhuman,
assume their form and take on their characteristics as a consequence of their
relations with other actors (Akrich & Latour, 1992; Law, 1999; Law & Hetherington,
1999). Akrich and Latour’s (1992: 259) redefinition of ANT as a semiotic theory of
material assemblies reclaims a more general ‘nontextual and nonlinguistic
interpretation’ of semiotics as meaning ‘how one privileged trajectory is built, out of
an indefinite number of possibilities.’
ANT also focuses on investigating how institutionalization is ‘performed,’ how
materials of all sorts are ‘disciplined, constituted, organized, and/or organizing
themselves’ (Law & Hetherington, 1999: ¶28). At the core of the approach lies
a concern with how actors and organisations mobilise, juxtapose and
hold together the bits and pieces out of which they are composed; how
they are sometimes able to prevent those bits and pieces from
following their own inclinations and making off; and how they manage,
as a result, to conceal for a time the process of translation itself and so
turn a network from a heterogeneous set of bits and pieces, each with
its own inclinations, into something that passes as a punctualised
actor. (Law, 1992: ¶25)
Thus, through the ‘study of order building or path building’ (Akrich & Latour,
1992: 259), I seek to illustrate the precariousness of institutionalization that is hidden
by institutional theory; institutionalization does not exist outside its performance. I
use Callon’s (1986) four moments of translation (problematization, interessement,
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enrollment and mobilization) to illustrate institutionalization as a succession of
translations, where the focus is on the actors enrolled and mobilized, on material
heterogeneity, on actors performing relationally, and on contingency.
The empirical for the paper is the institutionalizing of Ireland’s Industrial
Development Authority (IDA), an agency established by the Irish Government in
1949 to foster the country’s indigenous industrial development. Over the years, the
organization’s brief was changed to attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),
before being given complete operational autonomy as a semi-state body with
national responsibility for both FDI and indigenous industrial development.
Through the contributions of ANT, therefore, I seek to address the concerns in
the call for papers to reconsider ‘the role of agency, power, persistence and change
in the process of institutionalization.’ Specifically, the paper seeks to address:


The historicity of institutions and their change;



Legitimation and de-legitimation;



Institutionalization and de-institutionalization; and



Structure, agency and institutions: overcoming dualism.

It is in following the actor-networks that we can come to explore how it is that
institutionalization is produced, without having to assume from the outset that which
we are looking to study (Cooper & Law, 1995), and that we may more clearly see the
‘complexity of historical becoming’ (Touraine, 1988: 11).

FOLLOWING INSTITUTIONALIZATION WITH ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY
For neo-institutionalists with an interest in understanding how institutions are
created, sustained and disrupted, ANT offers insights and contributions in three key
areas, namely, through moving from reification to relationality, from diffusion to
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translation and from power as property to power as product (Lawrence and Suddaby,
2006).
Institutionalization as Relational Effect
ANT provides a good canvas on which to paint ‘the discriminations that are
performed and the boundaries that are constructed in the activities it studies’ (Lee &
Hassard, 1999: 392). Through this approach, the analytical focus is relational and
process-oriented, treating, for example, institutions and organizations as precarious,
interactive effects, which are generated, heterogeneous, patterned, uncertain and
contested in character (Law, 1992).
At the heart of ANT is the metaphor of heterogeneous networks (Law, 1992)
where, for example, institutionalization is the result of much hard work in which
various bits and pieces, human and nonhuman, are juxtaposed into a network
configuration that surmounts their individual resistances.

Said another way,

institutionalization is both a material matter and a question of arranging and ordering
those materials.
An actor is an effect generated in a heterogeneous network, such that, as
implied by the term actor-network, an actor is always a network (Law, 1992). Hence,
‘[a]n actor-network is simultaneously an actor whose activity is networking
heterogeneous elements and a network that is able to redefine and transform what it
is made of’ (Callon, 1987: 93).

Thus, beginning with a flat terrain, absent any

dualisms, the actor-network approach serves to bypass the agency/structure
distinction common to much social theory (Latour, 1986; Strum & Latour, 1987), such
that actors derive their intentionality and identity from the network, and not as
independent agents.
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For ANT, all materials, human and nonhuman, have the characteristics they
do as a consequence of their relations with other materials. ANT, therefore, is also
understood in terms of relational materiality and performativity. In the case of the
former, it employs a material semiotics whereby entities, human and nonhuman,
assume their form and take on their characteristics as a consequence of their
relations with other entities (Akrich & Latour, 1992; Law, 1999; Law & Hetherington,
1999). Akrich and Latour’s (1992: 259) redefinition of ANT as a semiotic theory of
material assemblies reclaims a more general ‘nontextual and nonlinguistic
interpretation’ of semiotics as meaning ‘how one privileged trajectory is built, out of
an indefinite number of possibilities.’ Thus, defining semiotics as the ‘study of order
building or path building’ (Akrich & Latour, 1992: 259) broadens its meaning to
encompass the orderings of material things.
For Law and Hetherington (1999), a material semiotics has to do with
materiality in the sense the institutional is created in circumstances that are
materially heterogeneous, and it is a semiotics in that it assumes the institutional,
along with what goes into producing the institutional, acquires its meaning and
significance because of how everything interacts together, not because of its
essential characteristics or qualities.

Through seeking to understand how

institutions are created, maintained and disrupted, therefore, a semiotics of
materiality refuses the division between human and nonhuman, in addition to any
prior judgment as to what counts as important or not, in favor of looking at the entire
range of heterogeneous bits and pieces that go into the institutional (Law &
Hetherington, 1999).
It is here that the notion of performativity enters into play (Latour, 1986; Law,
1999; Law & Hetherington, 1999; Strum & Latour, 1987).

In constituting the
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contingent, emergent phenomenon that we may come to call an institution (if at all),
materials of all sorts ‘are being disciplined, constituted, organized, and/or organizing
themselves’ (Law & Hetherington, 1999: ¶28). As a creation, an effect produced
within heterogeneous relations, the material outcome that we (may come to) identify
as an institution does not exist outside its performance.

The institutional is an

achievement as a result of performing the relations in which it is situated; it is how
such performance is achieved that is of interest to ANT. It is precisely because the
institutional is nothing more than relational effects that it is important to study how it
is produced (Law, 1999; Law & Hetherington, 1999).
Therefore, in moving from attending to the reified elements of institutions
towards seeing institutions as relational effects (Law, 1992), an ANT approach draws
attention to the ongoing and dynamic interactions that go into producing and
contesting what we come to see as the outcomes of institutional work. For example,
rather than tracking isomorphism through time and space, institutional researchers
adopting an ANT perspective would focus on exploring the processes of interaction
through which isomorphism emerges, is reproduced and contested.
Seen thusly, ANT provides those engaged in institutional work with a means
of addressing the issue of how to empirically investigate a phenomenon unavailable
to conscious perception (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006: 242). As things stand with
traditional institutional work, it is only when institutions are being created or
destroyed that the agency underlying institutional work becomes most visible and
accessible, for it is here that the taken-for-grantedness is exposed. Outside of this,
during periods when institutions have become reified and are apparently stable, neoinstitutional research is faced with the problem of how to account for such stability.
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ANT provides a way out of this dilemma through focusing on how different
networks are built around competing programs of action that generate outcomes,
instead of being distracted by outcomes alone. As such, through problematizing the
widely shared view of institutions as concrete and enduring social structures, in
addition to reminding those engaged in institutional work that the very institutions
and organizations they study ‘are fictions actively created and re-created by actants’
(Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006: 242), ANT is well placed to facilitate a broadening
and deepening of our understanding of institutional work.
Institutional Work as Translation
From an ANT perspective, much organizational theorizing engages in the practice of
purification, which requires categorization and classification, and it is through
purifying that institutions can be identified. They can be classified and categorized
according to an abstract set of features, such that they are rendered static,
permanent, timeless, universal and, above all, knowable. In being purified, they
become ideal-types against which to measure and verify that which pertains to them.
But the question is, in order to purify, what has the knowledge-making enterprise left
out? To focus on the practice of purification is only part of the story, for there is
another practice, that of translation, on which much of our theorizing depends for its
existence and yet which it denies at the same time (Latour, 1993).
Concurrent with purifying the messy world in which we live, we also engage in
translation. Here, far from separating everything into neat categories, their contacts
are amplified, mixing together humans and nonhumans, without bracketing anything
and without excluding any combination, in the process creating hybrids in the form of
networks of humans and nonhumans. Different from the practice of purification,
which involves separation, the practice of translation involves the threading together
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of any or all of these actors into a network that makes sense.

It entails

interconnecting these heterogeneous elements and viewing them as performing
relationally, as interacting to produce what we contingently call an institution, with
one actor seeking to redefine the meaning of the other actors, enrolling them into a
position, such that its interests also become theirs. What results from the practice of
translation are hybrids, networks that are both contingent and emergent. They are
contingent in that their relations are never fixed for all time, such that the actornetworks could come asunder should the interests of any actors diverge. Similarly,
they are emergent in that they do not appear ready formed, as pure essences that
always-already existed.
In focusing more on ‘the processes through which discretion emerges’ and
less on ‘the problem of giving accurate descriptions of discrete elements’ (Lee &
Hassard, 1999: 398-399, emphasis in original), the empirical for ANT becomes the
site of ‘active processing’ where not only are the descriptions of the institutional
being worked and reworked by participants, both human and nonhuman, but so too
is the institutional itself. In addressing the institutional, therefore, ANT focuses its
efforts on investigating how the institutional is ‘performed.’
Moving away from diffusion, ANT’s concept of translation affords researchers
looking to move past the totalizing view of institutions and institutional outcomes with
both a conceptual and methodological means to advance their work. Thus, rather
than trace diffusion across space and time, an ANT approach attends to the local
motivations for adopting isomorphic templates, norms or practices, for example, and
to local variations in the use and outcomes of adopting these isomorphic templates,
norms or practices.

What ANT avoids assuming is that all actants within an

emerging network act in a similar way and for similar reasons. Indeed, different
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actants not only take on similar templates, norms or practices for different reasons,
but, in the process of adoption, they also introduce slight changes to them (SahlinAndersson, 1996). Therefore, a key difference between diffusion and translation is
that diffusion is interested in the movement of a physical object through time and
space; translation calls attention to the changes that take place in meanings and
interpretations as a physical or social object travels through a network (Czarniawska
and Sevón, 1996).
Power as Product of Network Interactions
From an ANT perspective, power is conceptualized as a network effect: it ‘is not
something you can hoard and possess, it is something that has to be made’ (Latour,
1986: 274, emphasis in original), where the focus is on processes of enrollment and
translation. As Murdoch notes (1995: 748), ‘those who are powerful are…those able
to enrol, convince, and enlist others into networks on terms which allow the initial
actors to ‘represent’ the others. ’
Thus, by way of a third contribution to the study of institutional creation,
reproduction and demise, ANT facilitates those doing institutional work in moving
away from conceiving of power as property towards seeing it as the product of
network interactions (Callon and Latour, 1981): power is not the preserve of any
individual actant with a network, rather it is distributed and it is the collective
interaction of actors within a network that produces power. Seeing power thusly, that
is, as a distributed process, moves the focus away from the locus or agents of
change, for example, towards how actor-networks grow in size, complexity and
power

and

draws

on

Callon’s

(1986)

process

of

translation,

namely,

problematization, interessement, enrollment, mobilization. It moves the focus away
from power used to mobilize resources within an institutional field towards attending
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to how institutions are created and contested, which, in turn, defines the resources
and actants comprising the field. ANT affords a political perspective of power, where
institutions appear as powerful and stable structures because of the actants holding
together in a network and not because of their material or intrinsic nature. Power
and agency are products of an actor-network that has become (temporarily)
stabilized or black-boxed.

DOING ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY
The empirical site is Ireland’s Industrial Development Authority (IDA), an agency
established by the Irish Government in 1949 to foster the country’s indigenous
industrial development. Over the years, the organization’s brief was changed to
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), before being given complete operational
autonomy as a semi-state body with national responsibility for both FDI and
indigenous industrial development.
In terms of the data, I had recourse to both archival and interview material.
The primary and secondary archival sources to which I had access were those
available in the public domain, and included:
• Oireachtas (parliament) archives,
• National Archives, which cover civil
which cover debates and questions
service department records from the
from the foundation of the state (1922)
foundation of the State (1922) up to
to the present.
1976.
• Media archives.

•

• Government-sponsored
reports/reviews.

• IDA Annual Reports, 1969/70 to 1994.

• Government policies and economic
programs.

• Published work (e.g., articles, books,
reports, monographs) relating to the
period under study.

Legislation.

In addition to archival material, I also conducted semi-structured interviews
with the three surviving IDA managing directors, who represent key decision-makers
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with intimate knowledge of the IDA and much of the period under study.

The

interviews were concerned with such broad areas as: the IDA’s creation and
evolution, encapsulating the key events, large or small, that shaped the its creation
and evolution over time since; the IDA’s persistence over time; institutional supports
and

threats;

how

the

organizations

was

viewed/supported/challenged

by

government, politicians, the civil service, the media, the public, other government
agencies, indigenous industry, foreign investors.
For the purposes of analysis, I first constructed a running chronology of the
events so as to begin to get a handle on what I was dealing with. The starting point
for the chronology was the period immediately prior to the creation of the IDA as an
administrative body in 1949, when the alternative was to continue with the status quo
option of the Department of Industry and Commerce, and the end-point marks the
restructuring of the IDA into three separate agencies – Forfás, Forbairt
(subsequently, Enterprise Ireland in 1998) and Industrial Development Agency
Ireland – in 1994.
Initially, I had intended using ANT’s association/substitution mapping
mechanism (Latour, 1991; Latour, 1999; Latour, Mauguin & Teil, 1992) to follow the
actors and illustrate the work of translation, hybrid-creation and purification involved
in institutional creation, reproduction and disruption. While this work was done, reengagement with Callon’s (1986) four moments of translation emerged as the
preferred analytical lens. The four ‘stages’ are better understood as overlapping
moments in an ongoing and contested process than as clearly demarcated steps
toward a final endpoint.
The first moment, problematization, the primary actor defines the problem and
the set of relevant actors. By defining the problem and the program for dealing with
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it, the primary actor makes itself indispensable such that it becomes an obligatory
passage point for these others' attainment of the solution. To problematize in this
way is to undertake an endeavor that may or may not be accomplished.
The remainder of the translation process consists precisely of struggles to
achieve consensus among all actors regarding this particular definition of problem
and solution. Interessement, the second moment, the primary actor recruits other
actors to assume roles in the network, roles that recognize the centrality of the
primary actor's own role. ‘Trials of strength’ will determine whether the actors, as
defined, will ‘submit to being integrated into the initial plan, or inversely, refuse the
transaction by defining [their] identity, goals, projects, orientations, motivations or
interests in another manner’ (Callon, 1986: 207). Through a variety of possible
mechanisms, devices and strategies, ranging from simple solicitation to seduction to
appeals to 'rationality' to force, interessement projects are concerned with locking
actors into the roles proposed for them, blocking out alternative identities, disrupting
all possible competing associations, constructing a system of links or alliances
among actors, and gaining their commitment.
When

successful,

interessement

validates

problematization

and

the

association(s) it implies. It also achieves enrollment, the third moment, in which
roles are defined and actors formally accept and take on these roles. Finally, in the
fourth moment, mobilization, the primary actor assumes a spokesperson role for
passive network actors (agents) and seeks to mobilize them to action. This moment
owes its name to the necessary movements and displacements that have occurred
as previously unrelated actors have come into a chain of association, been rendered
available and cooperative, and finally, become silent as the primary actor is now
permitted to speak for them.
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Having already applied ANT’s association/substitution mapping to the data, I
was already aware of key events and myriad actors in the IDA’s case.

From

immersion in the data to arrive at the initial mapping, I identified what appeared to
me to be the key actors to follow (Callon, 1986).

Through several rounds of

recursive processes, moving between data, actors, events, connections, I arrived at
what seemed to me a coherent story.

INSTITUTIONALIZING IRELAND’S INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Through focusing on the shifting assemblies of associations and substitutions, a
trajectory is built and this trajectory only appears in retrospect. It did not exist prior to
its construction; rather it was emergent and contingent. Throughout the telling of the
story, actor-networks are in constant flux, with hybrids abounding. To the degree
that any of these hybrids achieve stability and become blackboxed it is provisional.
Emerging from an Idea – Initial Problematization
We enter our story at a point where the blackboxed actor-network of protectionism in
Ireland has sought to ensure its continued existence through mobilizing the new
coalition government, itself an actor-network, which came to power following the
1948 general election. However, protectionism was facing difficulty, with industrial
inefficiency, migration from the land, unemployment, emigration and the balance of
payments all increasing. Now acting as spokesperson for protectionism, the new
government attempted to define the problem as one requiring industrial development
built around a new conception, the Industrial Development Authority. On its own,
this idea is insufficient to counter the challenge from the ‘industrial inefficiency /
migration from the land / unemployment / emigration / balance of payments’ hybrid.
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However, from here, we trace the accumulation of actors whose interests are
translated and aligned, such that they become enrolled and mobilized into action.
With protectionism under threat, members of government posited a new
organization, the IDA, as the vehicle through which to achieve a more efficient use of
protective measures and independent industrial development. The Department of
Finance initially proved unwilling to back the proposal, preferring instead the laissez
faire approach of private enterprise seeking out opportunity. If the proposal were to
go ahead, Finance was of the view that it would need to be an advisory board, and
not a ‘gang of crackpot socialist planners’, and that it would need to gain the
confidence of the business community (PM, P35B/75, 31-December-1948).
Finance’s influence would be assured through controlling the staffing of all but the
most senior positions.
Having translated the interests of the civil service, government then moved to
recruit other key actors.

Statements were issued to the media announcing the

government’s decision to establish the IDA and outlining its functions. Party leaders
addressed the party faithful to bring them on side and government ministers
addressed leading industrialists through speeches at meetings of the likes of the
Federation of Irish Manufacturers, all of which was reported on favorably in the
media.

In seeking to translate the interests of these key actors, government

statements and speeches were all aimed at reinforcing the rationale for, and benefits
of, setting up the IDA, while also assuaging any concerns that protection would be
removed.
While the proposed IDA’s composition was announced in early March 1949,
its four whole time members, who were selected for the depth and breadth of their
business knowledge and experience and for their extensive contacts (PDDE,
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Vol.119, Cols.1586-1587, 9-March-1950), held their first meeting on May 26th, 1949,
marking the IDA’s official coming into being as an administrative body with a staff of
13 civil servants (PDDE, Vol.138, Cols.545-546, 23-April-1953).

In terms of

freedom, the IDA members were neither civil servants nor subject to the regulations
or procedures of the civil service. Rather, as befitting their autonomous status and
their ‘self-governing, flexible type of organisation’, they were to have their own
offices, staff and funding and they were to ‘be free to frame their own programme, to
regulate their own procedure, to travel where and when they consider it necessary,
and generally to operate as a fully autonomous body’ (PDDE, Vol.119, Col.1587, 9March-1950).
Government also moved to attach the IDA to the Irish legal system, which
required fixing the interests of its own members in both chambers of the legislature
such that they voted in favor of the IDA at each stage in the process, in addition to
facing down the challenges posed by the opposition. Indeed, the opposition sought
to win over the IDA members with its threat to abolish the organization when it
returned to government. This threat required the government to make provision in
the legislation to safeguard the IDA members, thereby ensuring they did not defect
from the IDA actor-network. Equally, the government had to amend the proposed
legislation to ensure that industrialists did not defect. With all key actors, bar the
opposition, enrolled, the entire legislative process was finalized on December 13th,
1950, with the Act coming into force on December 20th, 1950.
‘The IDA’ has gone from conception, to proposal, to decision to establish, to
administrative body with members and staff, having functions and becoming
attached to the entire Irish legal system in the process.

The success of the

translation is only possible by relentlessly sustaining the entire succession of
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accumulated actors, by the actors holding together and not defecting and by the
actor-network enrolling sufficient actors to overcome challenges. However, though
we have arrived at what appears to be a stable organization, this end point is
provisional and the reality that ‘the IDA’ has gained remains open to further
transformation, as we will see. What we are already seeing is that institutional work
is a materially heterogeneous process, where actors perform relationally to produce
an effect we provisionally call ‘the IDA.’
However, the IDA actor-network still faced challenges. While it was granted
autonomy and responsibility for most industrial policy functions, it was not granted
executive authority.

As such, the IDA was in the position of making

recommendations to the Minister, who would then consider them before forwarding
to government for consideration, this making for a cumbersome and drawn-out
decision-making process. Added to this, the IDA’s workload and lack of matching
resources led to it becoming overworked, such that policy development lost out to
administering protectionism. Different to what was required of the Department of
Industry and Commerce before it, the IDA’s administrative burden was made all the
more cumbersome by the procedure imposed on it to closely examine each
application for protection, which often involved visiting the applicant’s business
(Walsh, 1983, cited in Girvin, 1989: 178). The IDA chairman sought increased staff
and capital resources to promote new industries, along with authority to construct
advance factories. Although supported by some in government, the request was
refused by the Taoiseach (i.e., Prime Minister) and the Ministers for Finance and
Industry and Commerce (NAI, MacBride, 9-November-1950, IDA S.14474). Thus,
despite public assurances of the ‘fullest support’ of government, the IDA was
handicapped by the wide scope of its brief and a concomitant lack of resources.
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On top of this, the opposition returned to government in 1951, and with them
came the threat to abolish the IDA. The threat never materialized, however, as the
new Government’s interests had also been translated in favor of keeping the IDA,
having ‘always recognized … that there would be some advantage in having a body
outside the civil service, with powers and resources to promote the creation here of
new industries’ (PDDE, Vol.126, Col.1514, 12-July-1951).

Intending to use the

organization now that it existed, and following discussions with the IDA’s chairman to
arrange how it should operate, the Government decided to confine the organization’s
work to the promotion of new industry and to remove the burden of administrative
work that had been handicapping its efforts (PDDE, Vol.126, Col.1515, 12-July1951).

Thus, while there was potential for dissidence with the change in

government, thereby bringing into question what had already been gained, the new
Government unburdened the IDA from the burden of administering protectionism
such that it could focus on promoting new industry.
As Figure 1 (below) shows, to this point in our story, the IDA emerged as the
actor-network’s obligatory passage point through which to overcome the
problems/obstacles the actors face in attaining what they want.

Having been

enlisted and defined through problematization, each actor has submitted itself to
being locked into place and to being enrolled.
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IDA

Government

Civil
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Irish
Industrialists

Obstacle /
problem:
loss of
control /
influence
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emigration

Long-term
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problem:
unemployment,
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Goals of
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Deliver on
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Advise and
support
government

Perpetuate
itself

Obligatory Passage Point: Will an autonomous industrial development authority contribute
to economic self-sufficiency through promoting indigenous industry development?

Figure 1: Initial problematization – Obligatory passage point and associations
between actors.

Changing Tack – New Problematization 1
Initially, the IDA vigorously opposed the country’s participation in the general
liberalization of trade gathering pace in Europe from the late 1940s. The IDA’s
opposition held sway, convincing Government that there was no strategy in place to
progress Irish industry sufficient to withstand external competition and so justify
liberalization without endangering the country’s economic independence (NAI, 6April-1950, UNO/ITO S.13915A and B). However, experience on the ground was to
alter the IDA’s view with respect to foreign investment as a means to driving
industrial development.
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Narrowing the IDA’s focus marked a critical move for its future development,
albeit the sense of uncertainty surrounding its future also weakened it for a time
(McCourt, 1984; Walsh, 1983, cited in Girvin, 1989: 180). While the IDA had no
clear idea of its role, for much of the 1950s it was engaged in learning through doing
and in building its legitimacy, credibility and influence with Government and industry
(Girvin, 1989: 180). With little to offer in promoting new industry, the IDA attracted
investment from whatever source was available, whether foreign or indigenous, in
the process learning what investors required. Allied with its learning, the IDA also
invested in building a good working relationship with the Minister for Industry and
Commerce such that, taken together, its advice on the importance of new policies
was increasingly valued. Thus, starting from a position of advocating the interests of
protectionism, the IDA’s view gradually changed to seeing export-led industrialization
as the only way to develop the Irish economy and foreign investment as a source for
such industrialization.
With challenges from the ‘industrial inefficiency / migration from the land /
unemployment / emigration / balance of payments’ hybrid persisting, and with trade
liberalization growing apace outside of Ireland (e.g., GATT, ECSC, EEC), the IDA
emerged as a key actor and spokesperson for export-led industrialization,
specifically through foreign direct investment. Defining the problem for government
as the ‘chronic economic problems that had defied solution over the course of 34
years of independence (PDDE, Vol.155, Cols.54-63, 7-March-1956), the IDA sought
to determine and fix the interests of actors as lying in attracting foreign direct
investment, with the IDA as the vehicle through which to attract such investment (see
Figure 2).
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Obligatory Passage Point: Will an autonomous industrial development authority contribute
to economic development through promoting foreign direct investment?

Figure 2: New problematization 1 – Obligatory passage point and associations
between actors.
Government was slow to bite. While foreign investment was welcomed as
early as 1953 (Girvin, 1989: 181; PDDE, Vol.155, Col.65-66, 7-March-1956),
government was not prepared to amend the Control of Manufactures Acts, a key
actor supporting protectionism, to make such investment easier (Girvin, 1989: 181).
It was not until various public statements in the early part of 1955 that government
signaled the growing need to attract both foreign direct investment and technical
competence to facilitate industrial expansion (PDDE, Vol.149, Col.525, 23-March1955).
With government now on side, and aware that investors would ‘have to be
wooed aggressively’ (PDDE, Vol.152, Cols.1096-1097, 14-July-1955), the IDA began
to actively promote the ‘very special advantages [Ireland had] to offer the external
investor’ in terms of location for ease of access to European and UK markets, trade
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agreements with most European countries, duty exemptions for Irish goods exported
to the UK and preferential tariff treatment for Irish goods exported to British
Commonwealth countries (PDDE, Vol.149, Cols.525-526, 23-March-1955).

1955

saw the IDA meet with 40 companies in Sweden, 30 companies in Germany and 18
companies in Belgium (PDDE, Vol.155, Col.46, 7-March-1956). The following year,
an IDA delegation spent three weeks promoting Ireland in the US, meeting with 32
companies, bankers, representative bodies and government departments amongst
others, with another delegation addressing a meeting in the Netherlands arranged by
3 Dutch employers’ associations and discussion with the Federation of British
industry facilitating IDA contact with British industrialists (PDDE, Vol.158, Cols.756757, 20-June-1956). Experience with this program of visits saw the IDA open its first
office in New York, staffed by its first permanent representative abroad, and launch
its first advertising campaign towards the end of 1957 (PDDE, Vol.166, Cols.794795, 25-March-1958; Wall Street Journal, 1957: 11).
Now enrolled in support of the IDA, government introduced export profit tax
relief (EPTR) in the Finance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956, which started at a
50 per cent reduction in taxes on export profits for a period of five consecutive years,
to persuade foreign industrialists to use Ireland as an export base. The Finance Act,
1958, increased the EPTR to 100 per cent and extended the relief from five to ten
years up to the year 1970. According to White (MacSharry & White, 2000: 246-7), at
a time when the IDA had few other advantages to attract foreign investment, EPTR
sent two strong messages to international business: first, that Ireland was proenterprise through rewarding profit; and, second, that the country favored a longterm approach to investment, as signaled by the initial (5-year) and subsequently
lengthened (10-year) tax horizon.
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Government also introduced further legislation to facilitate the IDA in its role of
attracting FDI. Enacted in July 1958, the Industrial Development (Encouragement of
External Investment) Act, brought about an easing in the restrictions on foreign
ownership of industry, further signaling the government’s intent to welcome foreign
participation in support of driving export-oriented industrial development.
From playing a relatively passive role in support of protectionism, the IDA has
now moved to being the lead actor in building a new actor-network, in the process
translating the interests of, enrolling and mobilizing such actors as government, the
Irish tax system, the Irish legal system, foreign industrialists, advertising, and trade
agreements.

Through these associations, the IDA actor-network is extended in

scale and it cannot be dissociated from the other actors that hold it together and that
it also holds together. In the process of building this network, the IDA is seeking to
firmly place itself at the center, aligning the interests of other actors, willingly, with its
own.
Institutionalizing the IDA
With tentative moves already made towards de-institutionalizing protectionism, and
with the IDA firmly favoring FDI, government instituted a definitive policy shift in
1958, abandoning protectionism in favor of outward-looking economic development.
This shift was rooted in two documents.

The first, Economic Development

(Department of Finance, 1958a), presented a comprehensive overview of the entire
economy produced by the Secretary of the Department of Finance, and head of the
civil service, T.K. Whittaker, who noted:
The policies, hitherto followed, though given a fair trial, have not
resulted in a viable economy. … [L]arge-scale emigration and
unemployment still persist. The population is falling, the national
income rising more slowly than the rest of Europe. A great and
sustained effort to increase production, employment and living
standards is necessary to avert economic decadence. … It seems
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clear that, sooner or later, protection will have to go and the challenge
of free trade accepted. There is really no other choice for a country
wishing to keep pace materially with the rest of Europe. (Department
of Finance, 1958b: 2)
Building on Economic Development, the Programme for Economic Expansion
(Department of Finance, 1958b) concluded that achieving success would require that
the state provide adequate facilities to encourage industrial development, that
policies hampering industrial development be overhauled, modified or abandoned,
and that foreign investment in industry, either financial or technical, be welcomed
(Department of Finance, 1958b: 35-36).
By way of signaling the government’s intent with regard to the IDA, and
aligned with the IDA’s interests, the Programme for Economic Expansion focused
the organization’s role exclusively on attracting FDI, effectively turning it into an
investment promotion agency, with a clear indication to increase the organization’s
scope and resources should its efforts prove successful:
The Industrial Development Authority will continue the present drive to
attract foreign industrial development to Ireland. Considerable success
has already been achieved and it is reasonable to hope that the
successful establishment and operation here of important industries
financed mainly by foreign capital will serve as an attraction to other
similar ventures. The Government attach the greatest importance to
the promotional activities of the Industrial Development Authority and
will be ready to widen the scope of the organisation and increase the
resources at its disposal, if experience suggests the need for it.
(Department of Finance, 1958b: 40)
Over the course of the next decade, the IDA built its position as the obligatory
passage point for economic development through promoting FDI.

Translating

government interests for investment and jobs ensured the IDA continued to receive
whatever support it needed by way of funding and incentives, in turn seeing other
actors aligning with the IDA actor-network, e.g., increased operational budgets; more
overseas offices and representatives; a well-funded grants agency (An Foras
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Tionscal); the Finance Act, 1960, which extended the terminal date for EPTR at the
full rate to 1974-75; the Second Programme for Economic Expansion (Department of
Finance, 1963/64), which advocated increased resources; repeal in 1964 of the
Control of Manufactures Acts, 1932 to 1934, which freed the IDA’s hand to pursue
foreign investment in earnest; the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement, signed by both
governments in 1965 and coming into force on July 1st, 1966, which presented the
IDA with an additional, valuable promotional tool by way of duty-free access to the
UK market of 55m people; the Income Tax Act, 1967, which extended the terminal
date to 1979-80.
Likewise, determining and fixing the interests of industrialists for foreign
investment opportunities and supports saw yet more actors aligning with the IDA
actor-network, e.g., capital investment; factories; jobs; skills and training; an
Industrialists Promotional Panel, consisting of leading Irish and foreign industrialists
with established plants in the country, to support its work in attracting new industries
through initiating contacts abroad and promoting the idea of Ireland as a location for
industry (PDDE, Vol.230, Col.1759, 26-October-1967).
What we can see here is that institutionalizing the IDA is a relational process,
and that the IDA actor-network ‘is simultaneously an actor whose activity is
networking heterogeneous elements and a network that is able to redefine and
transform what it is made of’ (Callon, 1987: 93). Equally, as the gerund suggests,
institutionalizing is an ongoing process. The IDA does not arrive fully formed as a
concrete and enduring structure; rather, it is created and re-created through the
ongoing and dynamic interactions of the actors enrolled and mobilized to build the
network. Equally, as we are seeing, we never quite arrive at a unified actor called
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‘IDA’ for long, rather we are continuously dealing with IDA hybrids, with actors being
enrolled or displaced in the process of institutionalizing.
Institutionalizing the IDA – New Problematization 2
By the mid-1960s, the IDA enrolled consultants Arthur D. Little (1967a, 1967b) to
assist it in a major reappraisal of the program to attract foreign industry, which was
the IDA’s main function at that point in time (PDDE, Vol.222, Cols.1081-1082, 3May-1966). While establishing the IDA was seen as proof of government policy to
attract foreign investment, the task of persuading enough new industry to locate in
Ireland to create the level of employment needed meant the IDA would also require
far greater resources than were given it, in addition to the capacity and flexibility to
control its own operations.
Operationally, the IDA had no control over the assignment or withdrawal of its
staff, nor over its structure.

Such decision-making lay with the Departments of

Industry and Commerce and of Finance, an arrangement that also contributed to
delays due to decisions having to be communicated through the Department of
Industry and Commerce to either Finance or the IDA. This situation was deemed
untenable on the grounds that the expanded role envisaged for the IDA would
require the recruitment and retention of a large and specialized senior staff, a staff
pool that did not exist in sufficient numbers within the civil service. Then existing
staffing arrangements did not afford opportunities for internal progression within the
IDA for either civil service or non-civil service staff, with both staff regimes having to
seek promotion outside the IDA and the IDA losing the experience of the staff
concerned.
Thus, on the one hand, the IDA was being asked to play an increasingly
demanding, key role in the country’s economic development, while being
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handicapped on the other through not having the operational autonomy to deliver on
that role. Given this context, Little (1967a) recommended:
•

Giving the IDA full control over its own internal operations through granting it the
status of a state-sponsored organization, in addition to consolidating decisionmaking power concerning industrial development within the organization.
Government would maintain overall control through its power to appoint the IDA’s
board members, through its broad responsibility for setting industrial policy and
through its broad control over the IDA’s budget.

•

Government pro-actively legitimize the IDA’s role and position, making it clear
through the reorganization legislation that both industrial development and the
IDA’s central role in it represented a vital, long-term program for Ireland to which
it was committed.

•

Consolidating incentive-making power through transferring the functions of both
An Foras Tionscal (The Industry Board) and Taiscí Stáit Teoranta ([the State
Investment Board] in terms of granting interest-free loans) to the IDA, effectively
abolishing An Foras Tionscal and establishing the IDA as the sole interface with
investors.

•

The IDA build a research capability to allow for more in-depth examination of the
likely success and benefit of investment projects, a capability that would also
facilitate timely decision-making on large projects requiring government approval

•

The IDA add expertise in advertising and promotion, research, pre-investment
client handling, service and assistance, post-investment client assistance, and
financing, in addition to strengthening the organization’s representation abroad.
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•

Expanding the IDA Board, strengthening the role and office of the chairman as
the organization’s CEO and increasing senior staff numbers to deal with the IDA’s
enlarged brief.

All in all, Little (1967a) represented a blueprint that was subsequently followed in recreating the IDA as an autonomous state-sponsored organization, charged with the
key task of coordinating and delivering on Ireland’s industrial development policy.
Indeed, according to White, it was the IDA itself that both engineered the Little
review and directed its content.
Two further reviews, by the National Industrial Economic Council (1968) and
the Public Services Organisation Review Group (1966-1969), echoed and reinforced
the reorganization recommended in Little (1967a), calling for the existing range of
agencies dealing with industrial development to be streamlined and expertise to be
concentrated within the IDA.

The Third Programme for Economic and Social

Development (Department of Finance, 1969) confirmed the overhaul of the industrial
development institution itself through its concentration in a more autonomous and
powerful IDA, with the Industrial Development Act, 1969, enshrining what the IDA
sought in legislation.
As Figure 3 (below) shows, the IDA remains as the actor-network’s obligatory
passage point, albeit with a subtle change, through which to overcome the
problems/obstacles the actors face in attaining what they want.

Having been

enlisted and defined through problematization, each actor has submitted itself to
being locked into place and to being enrolled.
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Obligatory Passage Point: Will an autonomous, semi-state industrial development authority contribute to
economic development through furthering both foreign direct investment and indigenous industry development?

Figure 3: New problematization 2 – Obligatory passage point and associations
between actors.
The actor ‘Industrial Development Act, 1969’ neatly blackboxes the series of
associations and substitutions comprising the IDA actor-network to this point, in the
process producing a (temporary) unified IDA actor translated as ‘autonomous semistate organization’. However, the work of translation and hybrid-creation does not
stop with the creation of this unified actor; the process of institutionalization
continues.
To this actor are enrolled yet more actors, to include managing director,
operational

structure,

committees, boards, divisions, staff, annual targets,

performance reports, statistics on jobs approvals, financial commitment, fixed asset
investment, strategies for picking winners, programs, reputation, promotion methods,
presentations, target companies, promotional task forces, phone calls, hotels, foreign
countries, advertising campaigns, promotional tours, foreign journalists, emerging
sectors, industrial clustering, skilled labor, infrastructure, electronics industry, Apple,
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Amdahl, Microsoft, etc, etc. This extension in scale contributes to holding together
the actor-network, such that, for example, investors do not defect to join some other
actor-network.
Come the end of the 1970s, we are dealing with a unified actor, ‘IDA,’ which is
a materially heterogeneous network of legislation, finance, FDI, indigenous industry,
programs, incentives, policies, staff, public sector organizations, universities, jobs,
promotion methods, advertising, organizational structures, to name but some of the
actors. Blackboxing and purifying all these actors as ‘IDA’ serves to hide them from
view, but, as we have seen, the macroactor ‘IDA’ would have no reality without all of
these actors joining together in a network and performing relationally through a
series of translations and hybrid-creations.

The semblance of reality, of an

organization we call ‘IDA,’ is not given but comes from this actor-network holding
together.
According to Wickham (1983), Ireland’s success in attracting foreign direct
investment lay in the very particular situation of the IDA. As has already been noted,
the organization was effectively the sole industrial development body in the country;
it had, to this point, remained unchallenged by any power center either in the country
or outside it; it was shielded from political interference that would have impacted both
policy formulation and implementation; its ‘discretionary’ decision-making was suited
to dealing with private enterprise; and it was in a position to legitimate itself to both
the public and its own staff as fulfilling an important national task.
While Wickham’s observation points to success with foreign investment, the
same success was not achieved with domestic industry.

Having experienced a

decade of relative glory through the 1970s, the organization’s legitimacy came into
question on foot of the Telesis (1982) review and at a time when the country was
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experiencing the effects of a global recession, a poor foreign investment climate,
mounting domestic economic problems and increasing unemployment (IDA Annual
Reports, 1980-83; MacSharry & White, 2000; Telesis, 1982).
Questioning the IDA’s Legitimacy
However, the unified actor ‘IDA’, which is now much bigger in scale than at any other
point in our story, is challenged by a relatively strong anti-program at the start of the
1980s that sees the IDA’s legitimacy questioned. While reliance on FDI had found
general acceptance and largely went unquestioned, concerns nonetheless gradually
emerged throughout the 1970s about an over-reliance on such investment and its
tenuous links with the economy, not to mention a dualistic industrial structure and the
influence of external interests on national sovereignty (e.g., Cooper & Whelan, 1973;
Jacobsen, 1978; Kennedy & Dowling, 1975; Long, 1976; O’Donnell, PDDE, Vol. 242,
28-November-1969, Cols. 2247-48; O’Malley, PDDE, Vol.286, Cols.633-634, 2December-1975; Stanton, 1979; The Economist, 1977).
One critic, Dr. Noel Whelan (of Cooper & Whelan, 1973), ended up in a
position to initiate a review of industrial policy when he took over as chairman of the
National Economic and Social Council (NESC) in 1978 (PDDE, Vol.317, Col.573, 4December-1979). His position as NESC Chairman was all the stronger due to the
fact that he was also Secretary of the Department of Economic Planning and
Development (1977-79) and then Secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach.
Under his chairmanship, the NESC decided to commission a review to ensure that
government industrial policy was suited to creating an internationally competitive
industrial base in Ireland (NESC, 1982: iii).
In conducting its review, the NESC sponsored a five-part study, the first of
which (O’Malley, 1980) comprised a survey of literature and of changes in Irish
industrial policy over the period from the early 1960s. The second (Foster, Dorgan,
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Dewar & Segal, 1981) evaluated the state’s physical infrastructure and its impact in
hampering existing industry and acting as a barrier to attracting new industry. The
third (Blackwell, Danaher & O’Malley, 1983) analyzed the extent and nature of job
losses in industry. The fourth (Telesis, 1982) evaluated Irish industrial policy and the
fifth (NESC, 1982), in bringing together the analyses of the four previous studies, set
out conclusions and broad recommendations on industrial policy. The government
responded to the Telesis (1982) and NESC (1982) reports with the first ever White
Paper on Industrial Policy published in 1984.
The Telesis (1982) report had the greatest impact of all in regard to the IDA
and to industrial development policy. In assessing the state’s then industrial policy,
the review was complimentary on number of fronts.

Notwithstanding the

considerable national effort to industrialize over the preceding thirty years, the
review’s main criticism was that industrial development had largely depended on
foreign direct investment, while indigenous industry languished. Despite statements
pointing to the importance of indigenous industry, the allocation of resources told a
different story: funding for indigenous industry amounted to one-third of all funding
available, a proportion that remained stable over the preceding decade, with actual
funds disbursed only increasing slightly in real terms even though there were major
real increases in IDA budgets.
While Telesis (1982: 242) stated it was ‘positively impressed with Irish
industrial policy goals and implementation’ and that its recommendations were
‘designed to improve an already excellent effort,’ a different story emerged in the
national media, wherein the IDA was slammed for its poor performance in
developing indigenous industry and for touting job approvals as its metric of success
over jobs actually created. The report was leaked through the media in August
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1981, with Irish Business (1981) making its content public for the first time in an
article headed ‘Telesis: An Indictment of Irish Industrial Policy.’ Newspaper reports
presented Telesis as highly critical of the IDA:
More than 67,000 jobs paid for by State grants by the Industrial
Development Authority have failed to materialise, according to a
Government-commissioned report.
And the IDA – the biggest
spending State agency in the country – has been indicted as a ‘failure’
in the report carried out by American consultants. … The
report…places a serious question mark over the operations of the IDA
and recommends that the money it receives from the Government be
cut back and diverted to other bodies. (Aughney, 1981: 1)
Criticism leveled at the IDA by members of the Oireachtas was negligible,
indicative of the level of support enjoyed by the organization not only of successive
governments, but also of the political establishment.

Government came to the

defense of the IDA. The Taoiseach of the time, Garret Fitzgerald, pointed to the
failures of indigenous industry to prepare for liberalized markets, despite government
and IDA help to adapt to new conditions (PDDE, Vol.342, Cols.838-839, 11-May1983). The Tánaiste (i.e., Deputy Prime Minister) of the time, Dick Spring, pointed to
the continuity of industrial policy over successive governments since the late 1950s
and observed that the IDA was not to blame for the weaknesses identified by
Telesis; rather it was a problem of an inadequate policy framework (PDDE, Vol.342,
Col.861, 11-May-1983). For its part, the IDA believed the overall impact of Telesis
was harmful, with many of its core recommendations considered ‘reckless’, and saw
Telesis as an attempt by certain interests to substantially neuter the IDA (White,
2006).
Nonetheless, the organization acknowledged acceptance of many Telesis
recommendations and indicated that it was already dedicating more effort to
encouraging more companies to export and to bolstering the indigenous industrial
base (Snoddy, 1982: 31). Then managing director, White, emphasized the continuity
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of industrial policy and considered that programs would not be cancelled and that
existing policies would not be reversed (Snoddy, 1982: 31). As Keenan (1984: 23)
noted, the ‘IDA is not just good at promoting jobs; it is a remarkably flexible
organisation with a proven ability to respond to changes in the economic climate and
maintain its position as the pivotal organisation in development strategy.’
Representing its response to Telesis (1982) and NESC (1982), and
incorporating many of the recommendations contained in the IDA’s 1983 Strategic
Plan, the government published its White Paper on Industrial Policy (1984) to cover
the decade ahead. The major change implied in the White Paper was not to the IDA
nor was it to the general system of incentives; rather it was to the selective manner
in which the incentives were to be applied. The new policy orientation involved little
change with regard to foreign investment, albeit more emphasis was placed on
attracting projects where key functions, such as marketing and R&D, would be
performed, in addition to projects that would allow for development of linkages to the
Irish economy.
The White Paper (1984) recognized the significant contribution of the foreign
sector to the country’s economic development. It echoed the concerns of both the
NESC (1982) and the IDA in asserting that there would be no ‘sudden or radical’
changes to the incentives for foreign investment. Indeed, the government’s stated
position was that
[t]he consistency and stability over many years of our policies for
industrial development have been a major source of strength.
Changes in Government have not resulted in major reversals of policy
as has happened in other countries. There has always been a
favourable Government attitude towards investment in Ireland by
foreign industry. (White Paper on Industrial Policy, 1984: 7)
As such, the overall impact of Telesis was to refine both the IDA and industrial
development policy, with the IDA still very much the lead industrial development
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organization. The outcome of Telesis and the debate it engendered was the setting
of an adjusted course, building on past success and reflecting the lessons learned
from experience gained to that point.

While the IDA was seriously questioned,

potential dissidence was avoided through government and opposition remaining
aligned, along with foreign investors.
De-legitimizing and De-institutionalizing the IDA?
The early 1990s witnessed yet another review of industrial policy. The Industrial
Policy Review Group (IPRG) (1992), amongst other things, concluded that attracting
foreign investment is a fundamentally different activity to developing indigenous
industry and that the then existing configuration of agency structures was not
satisfactory.

Thus, the IPRG recommended for the creation of separate

organizational arrangements, with one state agency handling overseas investment
promotion, primarily a marketing and selling task, while integrating all existing
supports and agencies for indigenous industry into another agency, which would play
more of an advisory and consultancy role.
While the government accepted the IPRG recommendations and the
subsequent Moriarty Task Force implementation program, the recommendation to
restructure the IDA into two separate organizations emerged as the most contentious
of all (Taylor, 1992: 11), with competing actor-network emerging to define the
problem and the program for dealing with it. In support of restructuring the IDA were
the IPRG, most of the members of Moriarty Task Force, the Department of
Enterprise and Employment (formerly Industry and Commerce), its minister,
Desmond O’Malley, and his minority government party, the Progressive Democrats.
The IDA argued strongly that splitting up the organization would impede
building links between indigenous and foreign industry and lobbied steadfastly to
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have the strategy changed in favor of a single organization encompassing all state
supports to both overseas and indigenous industry (Taylor, 1992: 11). The majority
government party, Fianna Fáil, was against the creation of separate agencies,
preferring to accommodate the restructuring within the existing IDA, which was
already organized along separate indigenous and overseas lines. The largest of the
opposition parties, Fine Gael, also voiced its objections to splitting the IDA into two
separate organizations and urged that the proposed restructuring retain the IDA
intact (Irish Times, 1992). Two Moriarty Task Force members voiced disagreement
with the split: the Director of the Economic and Social Research Institute dissented
from the recommendation, while then Secretary of the Department of Finance, partly
concerned at the cost implications of funding two separate organizations, considered
that the restructuring could be accommodated within a single agency.
What emerged from the tussle was a hybrid proposal creating two separate
agencies, as the IPRG recommended, but with the addition of an umbrella agency
having a coordinating role in promoting greater linkages between indigenous and
foreign industry and an advisory role on the development and coordination of policy
within which the two agencies operate. The negotiation of a compromise between
the major and minor government parties was sufficient to enroll the major
government party to the program to split the IDA and so see blackboxing of the
policy review actor-network as concerns the IDA in the Industrial Development Act,
1993.

Thus it was that the policy refocus recommended from Telesis (1982)

onwards found subsequent expression in the formal recreation of the IDA as three
separate actors: Forfás, the umbrella organization; Forbairt (now Enterprise Ireland),
the indigenous industry organization; and IDA-Ireland, the overseas investment
organization.
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IN CONCLUSION…WHAT AN ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY ANALYSIS
ILLUSTRATES AND AFFORDS
As the ANT analysis illustrates, institutionalization is both contingent and emergent.
It is contingent in the sense that it is never fixed for all time, for the actor-network
could come asunder should any of the actors defect. And it is emergent in the sense
that the actor-network does not appear ready formed, as a pure essence that
always-already existed.
The only essence of the IDA actor-network is its total existence (Latour,
1991). Looking through the lens provided by ANT shows that institutionalization is
never quite static, never quite reified; rather the IDA blackbox is opened and renegotiated throughout the story, albeit the opening and re-negotiating often entailed
the enrolling and mobilizing of yet more actors to the IDA actor-network. As such, no
one particular part of the actor-networks being constructed is the essence of the IDA,
with all the other parts being merely context or packaging or history.
What we see through following the actors is the work of translation and
hybrid-creation, which goes unacknowledged in the more traditional renderings of
institutional work. Through following such work, we see that institutionalization is an
ongoing process and that, in this case, it was rare that we arrived at a unified,
blackboxed actor. Even then, the actor so purified was contingent and open to
further translation. What we see is that institutionalization is a process of building
associations, of materially heterogeneous actors performing relationally. Arriving at
a (contingently) stable actor is to arrive at such a materially heterogeneous actornetwork holding together such that it can be (temporarily) blackboxed and named.

37

Echoing Lawrence and Suddaby (2006), amongst others, and linking with the
concerns of the meeting’s sub-theme, I posit that ANT, as a theoretical and analytical
approach, holds promise in addressing the drawbacks of existent approaches to
institutional work. Of particular interest to this discussion is the re-articulation of
institutional work as a constructivist endeavor (Latour, 2002) and the intellectual
contribution an actor-network approach offers by way of viewing institutionalization
as relational performance, translation and power as product, away from the field’s
focus on reification, diffusion and power as property.
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